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Abstract— The success of the cloud computing paradigm is due to its on-demand, self-service, and pay-by-
use nature. According to this paradigm, the effects of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks involve not only the 
quality of the delivered service, but also the service maintenance costs in terms of resource consumption. 
Specifically, the longer the detection delay is, the higher the costs to be incurred. Therefore, a particular 
attention has to be paid for stealthy DoS attacks. They aim at minimizing their visibility, and at the same 
time, they can be as harmful as the brute-force attacks. They are sophisticated attacks tailored to leverage 
the worst-case performance of the target system through specific periodic, pulsing, and low-rate traffic 
patterns. In this paper, we propose a strategy to orchestrate stealthy attack patterns, which exhibit a 
slowly-increasing-intensity trend designed to inflict the maximum financial cost to the cloud customer, 
while respecting the job size and the service arrival rate imposed by the detection mechanisms. We 
describe both how to apply the proposed strategy, and its effects on the target system deployed in the 
cloud.  
Index Terms—Cloud Computing, Sophisticated Attacks Strategy, Low-Rate Attacks, Intrusion Detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
CLOUD Computing is an emerging paradigm that 
allows customers to obtain cloud resources and 
services according to an on-demand, self-service, 
and pay-by-use business model. Service level 
agreements (SLA) regulate the costs that the cloud 
customers have to pay for the provided quality of 
service (QoS) [1]. A side effect of such a model is 
that, it is prone to Denial of Service (DoS) and 
Distributed DoS (DDoS), which aim at reducing 
the service availability and performance by 
exhausting the resources of the service’s host 
system (including memory, processing resources, 
and network bandwidth) [2]. Such attacks have 
special effects in the cloud due to the adopted pay-
by-use business model. Specifically, in cloud 
computing also a partial service degradation due to 
an attack has direct effect on the service costs, and 
not only on the performance and availability 
perceived by the customer. The delay of the cloud 
service provider to diagnose the causes of the 
service degradation (i.e., if it is due to either an 
attack or an overload) can be considered as a 
security vulnerability. It can be exploited by 
attackers that aim at exhausting the cloud resources 
(allocated to satisfy the negotiated QoS), and 
seriously degrading the QoS, as happened to the 
BitBucket Cloud, which went down for 19h [3]. 
Therefore, the cloud management system has to 
implement specific countermeasures in order to 
avoid paying credits in case of accidental or 
deliberate intrusion that cause violations of QoS 
guarantees. 
Over the past decade, many efforts have been 
devoted to the detection of DDoS attacks in 
distributed systems. Security prevention 
mechanisms usually use approaches based on rate-
controlling, time-window, worst-case threshold, 
and pattern-matching methods to discriminate 
between the nominal system operation and 
malicious behaviors [4]. On the other hand, the 
attackers are aware of the presence of such 
protection mechanisms. They attempt to perform 
their activities in a “stealthy” fashion in order to 
elude the security mechanisms, by orchestrating 
and timing attack patterns that leverage specific 
weaknesses of target systems [5]. They are carried 
out by directing flows of legitimate service requests 
against a specific system at such a low-rate that 
would evade the DDoS detection mechanisms, and 
prolong the attack latency, i.e., the amount of time 
that the ongoing attack to the system has been 
undetected. 
This paper presents a sophisticated strategy to 
orchestrate stealthy attack patterns against 
applications running in the cloud. Instead of aiming 
at making the service unavailable, the proposed 
strategy aims at exploiting the cloud flexibility, 
forcing the application to consume more resources 
than needed, affecting the cloud customer more on 
financial aspects than on the service availability. 
The attack pattern is orchestrated in order to evade, 
or however, greatly delay the techniques proposed 
in the literature to detect low-rate attacks. It does 
not exhibit a periodic waveform typical of low-rate 
exhausting attacks [5], [6], [7], [8]. In contrast with 
them, it is an iterative and incremental process. In 
particular, the attack potency (in terms of service 
requests rate and concurrent attack sources) is 
slowly enhanced by a patient attacker, in order to 
inflict significant financial losses, even if the attack 
pattern is performed in accordance to the maximum 
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job size and arrival rate of the service requests 
allowed in the system. Using a simplified model 
empirically designed, we derive an expression for 
gradually increasing the potency of the attack, as a 
function of the reached service degradation 
(without knowing in advance the target system 
capability). We show that the features offered by 
the cloud provider, to ensure the SLA negotiated 
with the customer (including the load balancing 
and auto-scaling mechanisms), can be maliciously 
exploited by the proposed stealthy attack, which 
slowly exhausts the resources provided by the 
cloud provider, and increases the costs incurred by 
the customer. 
The proposed attack strategy, namely Slowly-
Increasing- Polymorphic DDoS Attack Strategy 
(SIPDAS) can be applied to several kind of attacks, 
that leverage known application vulnerabilities, in 
order to degrade the service provided by the target 
application server running in the cloud. The term 
polymorphic is inspired to polymorphic attacks 
which change message sequence at every 
successive infection in order to evade signature 
detection mechanisms [9]. Even if the victim 
detects the SIPDAS attack, the attack strategy can 
be re-initiate by using a different application 
vulnerability (polymorphism in the form), or a 
different timing (polymorphism over time). 
In order to validate the stealthy characteristics of 
the proposed SIPDAS attack, we explore potential 
solutions proposed in the literature to detect 
sophisticated low-rate DDoS attacks. We show that 
the proposed slowly-increasing polymorphic 
behavior induces enough overload on the target 
system (to cause a significant financial losses), and 
evades, or however, delays greatly the detection 
methods. Moreover, in order to explore the attack 
impact against an application deployed in a cloud 
environment, this paper focuses on one of the most 
serious threats to cloud computing, which comes 
from XML-based DoS (XDoS) attacks to the web-
based systems [10]. The experimental testbed is 
based on the mOSAIC framework, which offers 
both a ‘Software Platform’ that enables the 
execution of applications developed using the 
mOSAIC API, and a ‘Cloud Agency’, that acts as a 
provisioning system, brokering resources from a 
federation of cloud providers [11]. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Background and related work are presented in 
Section 2. Section 3 illustrates several examples of 
attacks, which can be leveraged to implement the 
proposed attack pattern. Section 4 describes the 
proposed strategy to build the stealthy attacks, and 
presents the attack pattern, whose detailed 
implementation is reported in Section 5. Section 6 
introduces the X-DoS attack used as case study. 
Section 7 shows the experimental results obtained 
running the attack pattern. Validation of stealthy 
characteristics is provided in Section 8. Some 
considerations about countermeasures against the 
proposed strategy are illustrated in Section 9. 
Conclusions and future work are described in 
Section 10. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
2.1 Related Work 
Sophisticated DDoS attacks are defined as that 
category of attacks, which are tailored to hurt a 
specific weak point in the target system design, in 
order to conduct denial of service or just to 
significantly degrade the performance [7], [12]. 
The term stealthy has been used in [13] to identify 
sophisticated attacks that are specifically designed 
to keep the malicious behaviors virtually invisible 
to the detection mechanisms. These attacks can be 
significantly harder to detect compared with more 
traditional brute-force and flooding style attacks 
[5]. 
The methods of launching sophisticated attacks can 
be categorized into two classes: job-content-based 
and jobs arrival pattern-based. The former have 
been designed in order to achieve the worst-case 
complexity of O(n) elementary operations per 
submitted job, instead of the average case 
complexity of Oð1Þ [14], [15], [16]. The jobs 
arrival pattern-based attacks exploit the worst case 
traffic arrival pattern of requests that can be applied 
to the target system [7], [17]. In general, such 
sophisticated attacks are performed by sending a 
low-rate traffic in order to be unnoticed by the 
DDoS detection mechanisms. In recent years, 
variants of DoS attacks that use low-rate traffic 
have been proposed, including Shrew attacks 
(LDoS), Reduction of Quality attacks (RoQ), and 
Low-Rate DoS attacks against application servers 
(LoRDAS). 
The terminology ‘stealthy DDoS’ mainly refers to 
Shrew attacks first introduced in [6], which was 
followed by a series of related research [18], [19]. 
It refers to periodic, pulsing, and low-rate attack 
traffic against the TCP protocol. Specifically, it has 
been used to exploit TCP’s retransmission time-out 
(RTO) mechanism, provoking a TCP flow to 
repeatedly enter in a RTO state. This is obtained by 
sending high rate but short-duration bursts (having 
round trip time scale burst length), and repeating 
periodically at slower RTO time-scales [5], [16]. 
RoQ attacks target the dynamic operation of the 
adaptation mechanisms widely adopted to ensure 
that the workload would be distributed across the 
system resources to optimize the overall 
performance [7], [12], [20]. By using a specific 
attack pattern, RoQ induces constant oscillations 
between the overload and underload states, without 
sustaining the attack traffic. This is achieved by 
timing the attack traffic and its magnitude in order 
to exploit the dynamics of the system. 
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As for LoRDAS, the applications are usually more 
vulnerable to DDoS attacks due to their 
complexity. Specifically, LoRDAS attacks have no 
necessary deviations in terms of network traffic 
volumes or traffic distribution with respect to 
normal traffic. Due to its high similarity to 
legitimate network traffic and much lower 
launching overhead than classic DDoS attack, this 
new assault type cannot be efficiently detected or 
prevented by existing network-based solutions 
[21], [22]. Therefore, in recent years, the target of 
DDoS attacks has shifted from network to 
application server resources and procedures. 
Several LoRDAS attack models against application 
server have been proposed [8], [23], [24]. In 
particular, they aim at keeping the service queue of 
the target application servers completely full of 
requests coming from the attacker, so that any new 
incoming request sent by legitimate users is 
discarded. Macia-Fernandez et al. [24] present an 
evolution of the low-rate DDoS attack against 
iterative application servers, and extends its 
capabilities to concurrent systems. They assume the 
target server has a finite service queue, where the 
incoming service requests are temporarily stored to 
be served by the corresponding application process 
or thread. The attack takes advantage of the 
capacity to forecast the time at which the responses 
to incoming requests for a given service occur. This 
capability is used to schedule an intelligent pattern 
in such a way that the attacked server becomes 
busy the most time in processing of the malicious 
requests instead of those from legitimate users. The 
actual availability of the service is thus reduced, 
while the data rate is low to elude potential defense 
mechanisms deployed against high-rate DDoS 
attacks at the server side. However, the major 
attention was paid to the mechanism for forecasting 
of the application server response times. Regarding 
this, Xiaodong et al. [8] propose a modified 
strategy, according to which the attack differs in 
behavior at different stage of the process. 
Specifically, the attack process has two different 
stages, before and after the service queue is filled 
up. The attacker monitors the number of attack 
requests that have been declined by the server 
within a recent period. If the requests are widely 
rejected, the attacker can assume that the service 
queue has been filled, and the attack is suspended. 
However, both the described attacks exhibit the 
typical periodic waveform of the low-rate DDoS 
attack, which consists of ON-OFF sequences of 
attack messages. Several works have proposed 
approaches to detect attacks that exhibit such a 
periodic and pulsing behavior [25], [26], [27]. 
2.2 Cloud Resources Provisioning 
Cloud providers offer services to rent computation 
and storage capacity, in a way as transparent as 
possible, giving the impression of ‘unlimited 
resource availability’. However, such resources are 
not free. Therefore, cloud providers allow 
customers to obtain and configure suitably the 
system capacity, as well as to quickly renegotiate 
such capacity as their requirements change, in 
order that the customers can pay only for resources 
that they actually use. Several cloud providers offer 
the ‘load balancing’ service for automatically 
distributing the incoming application service 
requests across multiple instances, as well as the 
‘auto scaling’ service for enabling consumers to 
closely follow the demand curve for their 
applications (reducing the need to acquire cloud 
resources in advance). In order to minimize the 
customer costs, the auto scaling ensures that the 
number of the application instances increases 
seamlessly during the demand spikes (to maintain 
the contracted performance), and decreases 
automatically during the demand lulls. For 
example, by using Amazon EC2 cloud services, the 
consumers can set a condition to add new 
computational instances when the average CPU 
utilization exceeds a fixed threshold. 
Moreover, they can configure a cool-down period 
in order to allow the application workload to 
stabilize before the auto scaling adds or removes 
the instances [29]. In the following, we will show 
how this feature can be maliciously exploited by a 
stealthy attack, which may slowly exhaust the 
resources provided by the cloud provider for 
ensuring the SLA, and enhance the costs incurred 
by the cloud customer. 
III. DOS ATTACKS AGAINST CLOUD 
APPLICATIONS 
In this section are presented several attack 
examples, which can be leveraged to implement the 
proposed SIPDAS attack pattern against a cloud 
application. In particular, we consider DDoS 
attacks that exploit application vulnerabilities[10], 
[12], [30], including: the Oversize Payload attack 
that exploits the high memory consumption of 
XML processing; the Oversized Cryptography that 
exploits the flexible usability of the security 
elements defined by the WS-Security specification 
(e.g., an oversized security header of a SOAP 
message can cause the same effects of an Oversize 
Payload, as well as a chained encrypted key can 
lend to high memory and CPU consumptions); the 
Resource Exhaustion attacks use flows of messages 
that are correct regarding their message structure, 
but that are not properly correlated to any existing 
process instance on the target server (i.e., messages 
that can be discarded by the system, but at the 
expense of a huge amount of redundant work, such 
as the Business Process Execution Language 
(BPEL) based document, which must be read and 
processed completely, before they may safely be 
discarded); and attacks that exploit the worst-case 
performance of the system, for example by 
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achieving the worst case complexity of Hash table 
data structure, or by using complex queries that 
force to spend much CPU time or disk access time.  
IV. STEALTHY DOS 
CHARACTERIZATION AND 
MODELING 
This section defines the characteristics that a DDoS 
attack against an application server running in the 
cloud should have to be stealth. 
Regarding the quality of service provided to the 
user, we assume that the system performance under 
a DDoS attack is more degraded, as higher the 
average time to process the user service requests 
compared to the normal operation. Moreover, the 
attack is more expensive for the cloud customer 
and/or cloud provider, as higher the cloud resource 
consumption to process the malicious requests on 
the target system. From the point of view of the 
attacker, the main objective is to maximize the ratio 
between the amount of ‘damage’ caused by the 
attack (in terms of service degradation and cloud 
resources consumed), and the the cost of mounting 
such an attack (called ‘budget’) [7]. 
4.1 Server under Attack Model 
In order to assess the service degradation attributed 
to the attack, we define a synthetic representation 
of the system under attack. We suppose that the 
system consists of a pool of distributed VMs 
provided by the cloud provider, on which the 
application instances run. Moreover, we assume 
that a load balancing mechanism dispatches the 
user service requests among the instances. The 
instances can be automatically scaled up or down, 
by monitoring some parameter suitable to assess 
the provided QoS (e.g., the computational load, the 
used memory, and the number of active users). 
Specifically, we model the system under attack 
with a comprehensive capability zM, which 
represents a global amount of work the system is 
able to perform in order to process the service 
requests. Such capability is affected by several 
parameters, such as the number of VMs assigned to 
the application, the CPU performance, the memory 
capability, etc. Each service request consumes a 
certain amount wi of the capability zM on the base 
of the payload of the service request. Thus, the load 
CN of the system at time t can be modeled by a 
queuing system M=M=n=n with Poisson arrivals, 
exponentially distributed service times, multiple 
servers, and n incoming requests in process (system 
capability). Moreover, the auto scaling feature of 
the cloud is modeled in a simple way: when new 
resources (e.g., VMs) are added to the system, the 
effect is an increase of the system capability zM.  
Therefore, given   legitimate type of service 
requests   =( 1,..., h), and denoted w as the cost 
in terms of cloud resources necessary to process the 
service request    , an attack against a cloud 
system can be represented as in Fig. 1. Specifically, 
Fig. 1 shows a simple illustrative attack scenario, 
where the system is modeled as: (i) a queue (that 
conceptually represents the load balancing 
mechanism), in which are queued both the 
legitimate user request flows fNj and the DDoS 
flows fAj (attack sources), and (ii) a job for each 
service request that is currently processed on the 
system. 
 
4.2 Stealthy Attack Objectives 
In this section, we aim at defining the objectives 
that a sophisticated attacker would like to achieve, 
and the requirements the attack pattern has to 
satisfy to be stealth. Recall that, the purpose of the 
attack against cloud applications is not to 
necessarily deny the service, but rather to inflict 
significant degradation in some aspect of the 
service (e.g., service response time), namely attack 
profit PA, in order to maximize the cloud resource 
consumption CA to process malicious requests. In 
order to elude the attack detection, different attacks 
that use low-rate traffic (but well orchestrated and 
timed) have been presented in the literature. 
Therefore, several works have proposed techniques 
to detect low-rate DDoS attacks, which monitor 
anomalies in the fluctuation of the incoming traffic 
through either a time or frequency-domain analysis 
[18], [25], [26]. They assume that, the main 
anomaly can be incurred during a low-rate attack is 
that, the incoming service requests fluctuate in a 
more extreme manner during an attack. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we propose a strategy to implement 
stealthy attack patterns, which exhibit a slowly-
increasing polymorphic behavior that can evade, or 
however, greatly delay the techniques proposed in 
the literature to detect low-rate attacks. Exploiting 
a vulnerability of the target application, a patient 
and intelligent attacker can orchestrate 
sophisticated flows of messages, indistinguishable 
from legitimate service requests. In particular, the 
proposed attack pattern, instead of aiming at 
making the service unavailable, it aims at 
exploiting the cloud flexibility, forcing the services 
to scale up and consume more resources than 
needed, affecting the cloud customer more on 
financial aspects than on the service availability. 
In the future work, we aim at extending the 
approach to a larger set of application level 
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vulnerabilities, as well as defining a sophisticated 
method able to detect SIPDAS based attacks in the 
cloud computing environment. 
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